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Introduction
The creation of a monetary union in Europe on 1 January 1999 is undoubtedly one of the largest macro and politico-economic experiments in modern history. It was the cap stone of the so-called 'Maastricht Process' designed to achieve macro economic convergence, which had shaped monetary and fiscal policies in the countries striving for membership in European
Monetary Union (EMU) over much of the 1990s. 1 The start of EMU was marked by the conversion of the national currencies of the member states into euros and the beginning of the operations of the new Euro System, the new European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of the participating states (NCBs).
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The Maastricht Treaty provides the institutional framework for the ECB. The Treaty requires that the NCBs of all participating states must be politically independent. The ECB is similarly independent from the governments of the member states and the political bodies of the European Union. The ECB is owned by the NCBs. Monetary policy decisions are made by the Governing Council (ECB Council, for short) whose members are the NCB presidents and the six members of the ECB Board. 3 Formally, Council decisions are taken by majority vote, with each member having one vote and the ECB president a second one in the case of a tie.
Numerous statements by the ECB president, Wim Duisenberg, indicate that the Council takes its decision by consensus or near-consensus rather than simple majority. In most instances, the debate seems to continue until a broad consensus is reached about the monetary policy proposal presented to the Council. In both aspects, the ECB Council seems to follow the practice of the Bundesbank Council in earlier years (von Hagen, 1999) .
A significant feature of the Treaty is that it mandates the ECB to regard price stability as the In October 1998, the ECB (1998 ECB ( , 1999 presented its strategy. It is based on a definition of price stability, and t wo "Pillars" that form the basis for the assessment of current developments and interest-rate decisions. The definition of price stability specifies the medium run rate of inflation which the ECB sees as compatible with the mandate to maintain price stability as the overriding objective of monetary policy as required by the Maastricht treaty. The ECB's definition of price stability is an annual increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), its main gauge of average inflation in the euro area, of below two percent. The ECB's two-pillar strategy comprises a reference value for M3 growth (First Pillar) and a ''broadly based assessment of the outlook for the future price developments'' (Second Pillar).
Both elements of the ECB's strategy have been subject of a controversial debate both in academic as well as in policy circles. But while the two-pillar strategy was at center stage of discussion in the first years of EMU, the ECB's inflation objective has become the subject of increasing controversy more recently. Background of this controversial discussion are widespread concerns that the ECB's inflation objective may be too low given global economic developments and persistent inflation differentials in the euro area. In its recent revision of its monetary policy strategy, announced on 8 May 2003 (ECB, 2003) , the ECB explicitly addressed these concerns by clarifying that its inflation objective is to maintain inflation rates below but close to 2%, in order to provide a sufficient cushion against the risk of deflation and in order to take into account the implication of inflation differentials within the euro area.
For the euro area as whole, there is a concern that the low inflation rates the ECB aims at may involve an unnecessary risk of deflation and aggravate the euro area's unemployment problem. The worldwide slump in equity prices since March 2000 has triggered fears that the whole industrialized world might experience a deflation spiral like Japan did in the 1990s 4 .
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Following the stock market crash in early 1990, Japan experienced a decade of financial fragility, weak economic activity and deflationary developments in goods prices, with consumer prices now falling continuously since 1999 5 . Other South East Asian countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have also experienced asset price deflations followed by a marked drop in credit creation and goods price deflation in recent years. By the end of 2002 the euro area share prices (Euro Stox 50) had fallen by more than 50% from their peak in March 2000, so that it is of course easy to draw parallels. Another argument holds that, due to the labour market rigidities prevalent in the euro area, the low inflation objective adopted by the ECB could cause an increase euro area unemployment. If there is downward nominal wage rigidity, low inflation would give rise to downward real wage rigidity and higher unemployment. This would imply that that the ECB should adopt a somewhat higher inflation objective in order to provide some 'grease' for European labour markets.
Despite the introduction of the single currency in January 2002, differentials in national price developments continue to exist in the euro area. Persistent inflation differentials are often rationalized by the Balassa Samuelson effect. Countries with higher productivity growth in the tradable-goods sector should experience higher rates of inflation. Given the economic heterogeneity among euro area countries, there is scope for persistent differences in productivity growth performances and thus for inflation differentials in the euro area. Since all countries face the same short-term nominal interest rate set by the ECB, some critics argue that inflation differentials give rise to real interest rate differentials. Countries with lower than average inflation would face higher than average real interest rates. The result might be an aggravation of disinflationary or even deflationary pressures in countries with already below average inflation rates.
In this paper we will assess whether these concerns about the adverse macroeconomic implication of low inflation in the euro area are justified. The plan of the paper is as follows.
Section 2 outlines and discusses the ECB's inflation objective. Section 3 assesses the areawide macroeconomic implications of the ECB's current inflation objective. Section 4 analyses the significance of inflation differentials in the euro area. Section 5 concludes. This definition of the ECB'S inflation objective was not the same as the inflation objective implied by the reference value for M3 growth, the key characteristic of the First Pillar. The reference value is derived based on a simple velocity equation. The reference value takes the growth rate of potential output less an assumed velocity trend as a starting point and adds the implicit target inflation rate. In October 1998, the assumed growth rate of potential output was 2-2.5%, while the assumed trend in velocity was a decline of 0.5-1%. The announced reference value, which has remained unchanged since then, was 4.5% (ECB, 1999) . The implied range of the target inflation rate is therefore 1-2%. This may be due to the fact that headline inflation was below 1% at the start of EMU and the ECB wanted to avoid the impression of starting monetary union with an inflation rate outside the target range.
Remarks by the ECB's chief economist Otmar Issing in a speech in June 2002 in Milan suggested that the ECB sees the lower bound of its inflation objective at 1%. In the revision of its monetary policy strategy, announced in a press release on 8 May 2003 (ECB, 2003) , the ECB clarified that ''it will aim to maintain inflation rates close to 2% over the medium term.'' goods price deflation in recent years.
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A look at the data suggests that the discussion about the lower bound of the ECB's inflation objective is essentially pointless. Figure 1 displays Main Refinancing Rate HICP Inflation Output Gap Figure 1 suggests that the main refinancing rate responded more to the output gap than to HICP inflation. This may reflect that the ECB tried to conduct policy in a forward looking way, since the output gap is often regarded as a leading indicator of inflation. Alternatively, it may reflect that the ECB also gives substantial weight to output stabilisation and does not only care about inflation. This interpretation is supported by evidence reported by Neumann (2002) and Hayo and Hofmann (2003) , who find that the weight on the output gap is larger in an estimated ECB Taylor rule than in an estimated Bundesbank Taylor rule. Another potential explanation is that the ECB cares about core inflation rather than headline inflation. Core inflation is measured by excluding food and energy prices from the HICP and is often regarded as a better measure of monetary inflation than headline inflation 6 . Figure 
The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation in the Euro Area
The pursuit of price stability as the overriding goal of monetary policy is based on theoretical and empirical findings that inflation causes real costs. Friedman (1969) argued that any opportunity cost associated with holding money gives rise to inefficient shoe-leather costs because households are forced to economise on money holdings 7 . Shoe-leather costs are minimised when nominal interest rates are zero, implying that there is an optimal rate of deflation equal to the level of the real interest rate. This is the famous Friedman rule. Phelps (1973) argued that the Friedman rule ignored that inflation is basically a tax on money holdings. This public finance approach to optimum inflation suggests that inflation should be positive, since an optimal tax system equalises the marginal costs of all taxes. The consensus view appears to be that neither a negative nor a positive rate of inflation, but rather price stability is the optimal goal for monetary policy 8 . Inflation and deflation both give rise to distortions in the relative price mechanism and, as a result, inefficient allocation of resources.
Furthermore, since tax bases are nominal, positive and negative rates of inflation distort the tax system (see, e.g. Feldstein, 1997) .
These arguments are the basis of the ECB's requirement to maintain price stability in the euro area formulated in the Treaty. However, in recent years this view has been challenged. For example, Svensson (2002) argues that the ECB should aim at an inflation rate of 2%, rather than below 2%, in order to have a larger cushion against the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates and the risk of a deflationary spiral in the euro area. The main argument is that if inflation is very low so are nominal interest rates so that a large negative shock is more likely to make the zero-bound on nominal interest rates binding. The risk of getting trapped in a deflationary spiral has been analysed in several studies based on shock s imulations in calibrated structural models. By simulating the effect of stochastic shocks similar in magnitude to those experienced in the recent past, these studies derive probabilities of a binding zero bound on nominal interest rates as a function of the inflation target.
Orphanides and Wieland (1998) simulate a small estimated rational expectations model of the US economy, assuming that monetary policy is conducted based on a simple interest rate rule, 7 The shoe-leather cost concept was originally developed by Bailey (1956) .
either a Taylor (1993) or a Henderson-McKibbin (1993) rule 9 , and that the economy is subject to shocks similar in magnitude to those observed for the US over the 1980s and 90s.
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) This means that the model solution becomes increasingly inaccurate the more likely a binding zero lower bound becomes. As a result, these models tend to underestimate the probability of a bind zero bound. Klaeffling (2002) Williams (2000) and Hunt and Laxton (2002) assume a steady real return of 2.5 and 2.2%
respectively. How does the assumed level of the steady state real interest rate affect the simulation results? A higher steady state real interest rate is associated with a higher steady state nominal interest rate given a specific inflation target. This means that for a given distribution of shocks the probability of hitting the zero lower bound will be lower. The historical real interest rate appears to be around 2.5%, suggesting that the results of Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and Klaeffling (2002) slightly overstate the risk if hitting the zero bound. The probabilities reported in Table 1 suggest that the risk of hitting the lower bound is negligible for inflation rates between 1 and 2 %, which is the range of inflation rates observed for the euro area. The simulation results apply to the US and Japan. However, the euro area is not fundamentally different in structure from these economies, so that the available evidence suggests that with the given inflation objective, there is only a negligible risk for the euro area to be driven into a deflationary spiral. payments or an increase in public spending. Orphanides and Wieland (1998) show that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates not only involves a risk of a deflationary spiral to evolve, but also implies a long-run Phillips
Curve trade-off for sufficiently low rates of inflation. The rationale behind this result is that while monetary policy can always fully stabilise positive shocks, its stabilisation capacity with respect to negative shocks is limited by the zero bound for low target rates of inflation.
This implies a positive relationship between average inflation and average output for sufficiently low rates of average inflation. As a result, the long-run Phillips curve is nonlinear, positively sloped for low average rates of inflation and vertical for higher average inflation rates. Orphanides and Wieland note, however, that in their model a noticeable longrun Phillips Curve trade-off only emerges for average inflation rates below two percent and is fairly small.
In a highly influential paper, argue that, because of downward stickiness in nominal wages, low inflation may come at the cost of a higher long-run average unemployment rate. With stable prices, downward stickiness in nominal wages will translate into downward stickiness in real wages and, as a result, higher unemployment 10 . In this sense, inflation ''greases'' the wheels of the labour market. An empirical implication of this argument is that the long-run Phillips-Curve is non-linear: Vertical for high rates of inflation and negatively sloped for low rates. The validity of this hypothesis has been tested both at the macro level by estimating long-run Phillips Curve trade-offs using aggregate price and unemployment data and at the micro level by directly assessing the relevance of downward rigidity in nominal wages. Akerlof et al. ( , 2000 simulate a long-run Phillips Curve for the US based on an estimated non-linear inflation equation. Inflation is modelled as a function of inflation expectations, unemployment and a measure of nominal rigidity, which is formulated as a function of the standard deviation of the desired change in wages, the trend growth rate of 13 productivity and lagged inflation rates. They find empirical support for their hypothesis that downward nominal wage rigidity gives rise to a long-run Phillips Curve trade-off at low rates of inflation and conclude that the optimal inflation rate, i.e. the inflation rate that is associated with the lowest long-run average unemployment rate, lies in the range of 1.6-3.2% (Akerlof et al., 2000, p. 37 ).
Wyplosz (2001) Thus, the evidence on the effect of inflation on long-term unemployment appears to be highly inconclusive and unreliable. Also, the studies discussed below are based on sample periods where very low rates of inflation were barely observed, so that in fact not sufficient observations in the relevant range of inflation are available in order to perform a convincing test of the hypothesis of a non-vertical long-run Phillips Curve at low inflation rates.
The evidence from micro data using data on wage settlements lends some support to the hypothesis of downward nominal wage rigidity. The evidence is usually based on the distribution of nominal wage and salary changes. Most studies find that this distribution is asymmetric, with wage cuts being substantially less common than wage increases and a disproportienately large share of unchanged wages 12 . However, Smith (2000) suggests that the concentration of nominal wage changes at zero may not necessarily reflect downward nominal wage rigidity but may also be due to measurement error and the wide-spread use of long-term wage contracts. But even if there is downward nominal wage rigidity, the macroeconomic effect of such rigidities has been questioned. Card and Hyslop (1997) and Smith (2000) argue that data on wage settlements tend to exaggerate the degree of aggregate nominal rigidity and that the macroeconomic effects of the nominal rigidities detected in wage settlement data are likely to be small.
Macroeconomic Implications of Inflation Differentials in the Euro Area
Since the start of EMU in 1999, the persistence of inflation differentials has become an increasing reason of concern in policy circles. Since the ECB's monetary policy is directed at inflation in the euro area as a whole, persistent inflation differentials across euro area countries will give rise to persistent real interest rate differentials. As a result, the ECB's monetary policy may be overly tight for countries already experiencing low inflation and too loose for countries experiencing high inflation rates. In order to asses how inflation dispersion has evolved since the introduction of the euro we report in Figure 5 the development of the standard deviation of the inflation rates in the euro area countries over this period. A common argument holds that, due to economic convergence, inflation differentials will tend to become smaller in a currency union. The graphs reveal that this was not the case in the euro area in the first four years of its existence.
In 1999 the standard deviation of inflation rates was 0.6 in 1999 and rose to above 1 in 2000 and 2001. In 2002 it further increased to 1.2. Inflation dispersion in the euro area appears to have increased rather than decreased since the introduction of the euro.
and Beissinger (1991) and Decressin and Decressin (2002) for Germany. The aggregate price inflation is given by 
countries with higher productivity growth in the tradable goods sector relative to the nontradable-goods sector will have higher inflation rates, also in a monetary union. between tradable and non-tradable goods sector was much smaller in Germany than in the rest of the euro area countries, implying that that in the EMU inflation in Germany will be substantially lower than in the other euro area countries. Based on cross-country productivity differentials they conclude that euro area inflation must be at least 1% in order to avoid deflation in Germany.
Independent of their causes, the existence of persistent inflation differentials in the euro area implies persistent differentials in real interest rates across euro area countries. Figure 6 shows how national real interest rates, i.e. the three months EURIBOR less national four-quarter inflation, compares to the euro area real interest rate, i.e. the three months EURIBOR less 19 four-quarter euro area inflation, since the start of EMU. The graphs suggest that real interest rates in Germany and France, the two largest euro area economies, were most of the time above the euro area real rate, while most other countries had below average real interest rates most of the time. What are the macroeconomic effects of these real interest rate differentials? A popular argument holds that countries with a boyant economy and higher than average inflation rates enjoy further stimulus by below average real interest rates, while weaker economies with a lower than average inflation rates are further weakened by higher than average real interest rates. This seems to imply that the common monetary policy will lead to an increasing economic divergence in the euro area 13 . The ECB will neither be able to dampen increasing inflationary pressures in the group of faster growing countries, nor will it be able to fend off deflationary developments in the weaker countries.
However, this line of argument disregards two important aspects. First, countries with lower than average inflation rates enjoy real depreciations vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area making their economies more competitive and thus stimulating net exports. Second, given the large 20 degree of market integration in the euro area, it may be rather the real interest rate measured in euro area prices rather than the real interest rate measured in national prices that matters for aggregate demand. Consider a firm's decision to finance an investment project at a nominal rate t i . The relevant (ex-post) real rate of interest is where y is the output gap measured as the percent gap between real GDP and potential real GDP, calculated using a standard Hodrick-Prescott-Filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600
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. r is the ex-post real interest rate, i.e. the short-term nominal money market interest rate less four quarter CPI inflation. e is the real effective and US y is the US output gap, which was included in order to control for external demand conditions. Data for seasonally adjusted real GDP, money market rates and the CPI, which was seasonally adjusted using the X-12 procedure of the US Census Bureau, were taken from the IMF International Financial
Statistics. Real effective exchange rates were taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Equation 1 Monetary Union. The regression was estimated both for the individual countries and by pooling the observations for the ten countries. The final specification was chosen by a general-to-specific modelling strategy, retaining all lags of a variable between the first and last lag significant at the 10% level, searching over up to five lags. If no lag was significant at least at the 10% level, the lag with the highest t-statistic was retained. The results are reported in Table 2 . It turned out that in each regression equation only one lag of each explanatory variable was retained. The exception are the Netherlands, were all five lags of the real interest rate were retained. We report the estimated coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. For the Dutch real interest rate we report the sum of the coefficients of the retained lags and the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the sum the coefficients equals zero. 
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The results suggest that the real interest rate is an important determinant of aggregate demand in euro area countries coming out significantly in six out of ten countries. The pooled regression yields a real interest rate elasticity of 0.5 which is significant at the 1% level. The effective real exchange rate is found to be a significant determinant of the output gap only in Italy and Portugal. In the other countries the exchange rate elasticities are insignificant, in Finland even significant with the wrong sign. This conclusion is reversed by the pooled estimator which yields an exchange rate elasticity of 0.25 which is significant at the 1% level.
The results also suggest that external demand conditions are an important determinant of euro area output gaps. The lagged US output gap is found to be significant at the 1% level in all ten countries.
At a first glance these results appear to imply that real interest rate differentials do matter in the euro area. With aggregate demand in the individual euro area countries being significantly affected by national real interest rates, real interest rate differentials will give divergent economic performances. Or will they? It turns that the answer to this question cannot be given 
Conclusions
The ECB's official inflation objective is an increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices of below 2% in the medium run. Many commentators argue that there is a deflationary bias in this definition of the inflation objective because the lower bound of the inflation objective is not clearly specified and that the low inflation objective increases the risk of a liquidity trap and may give rise to higher long-term unemployment because of rigid labour in the euro area. An assessment of the experience with the ECB's inflation objective over the first four years of EMU reveals that the discussion about the lower bound of the ECB's inflation objective is essentially pointless, because headline inflation was barely below two percent. This observation is consistent with the ECB's recent monetary policy revision, where it was clarified that the ECB aims at an inflation rate below but close to 2% (ECB, 2003) .
Fears of a liquidity trap or higher unemployment because of low inflation in the euro area also appear not to be supported by the empirical evidence. The empirical evidence on the liquidity trap suggests that the risk of hitting the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates is negligible for medium run inflation rates between 1 and 2 %, which is the range of inflation rates observed for the euro area. The evidence on the effect of inflation on long-term unemployment appears to be highly dependent on the chosen modelling strategy and must therefore be deemed to be inconclusive and unreliable.
A popular argument also holds that the common monetary policy will lead to an increasing economic divergence in the euro area because of national inflation differentials which translate into national real interest rate differentials. Countries with a boyant economy and higher than average inflation rates enjoy further stimulus by below average real interest rates, while weaker economies with a lower than average inflation rates are further weakened by higher than average real interest rates. We argue that, given the large degree of market integration in the euro area, it may be rather the real interest rate measured in euro area prices than the real interest rate measured in national prices that matters for aggregate demand. In order to assess the empirical relevance of real interest rate differentials and relative price developments in the euro area countries we estimate simple backward-looking IS Curves for 25 ten euro area countries. We show that aggregate demand in the euro area countries is significantly affected by the euro area real interest rate, but not by national real interest rate differentials.
